ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Busbar differential protection relays operate for internal (InZone) bus faults when the sum of currents that flow into the bus becomes unequal to the sum of all the currents that flow out the bus to the load. They are not supposed to operate spuriously for external faults or 'no-fault' conditions when sum of incoming and sum of outgoing currents are equal for the bus [5] [6] .
However, busbar differential relays may unintentionally operate on 'no-fault' or 'external faults' when faults in the power system cause high currents to flow through the protected bus causing saturation of some iron-cored CTs that provide information to the relay about the magnitude of the primary currents. Saturated CTs provide false information and report smaller current magnitudes than their actual values. As a result, the relay derives a differential current even when there is internal bus fault. To avoid unnecessary operation, manufacturers use different schemes to achieve relay stability during CT saturation.
Two differential schemes are widely used viz., conventional HiZ differential and modern LI numeric differential schemes.
High Impedance Differential Scheme (HiZ)
HiZ differential protection system consists of CTs whose secondary windings are connected in parallel with one high impedance voltage relay. HiZ protection responds to a voltage across the relay. The main requirement is that the relay should operate for an internal fault and should never operate for external faults even if there is CT saturation. For external faults causing CT saturation, the non-saturated CTs drive most of their currents through the secondary winding of the saturated CT. In that case, the voltage drop across the saturated CT secondary also appears across the relay, but typically it is relatively small. To avoid protection operation, the relay pick-up value has to be set above this false operating voltage. In the event of an internal fault, the sum of the CT secondary currents flows through the relay measuring element and the high resistance connected in series with the relay. The latter is known as the stabilising resistor. This results in a steep voltage increase across the entire scheme, causing fast saturation of all the CTs. The differential relay is designed to operate under these conditions. To ensure reliable operation for internal faults, the knee-point voltage of the CTs must be approximately two times the relay pick-up voltage. The protection sensitivity corresponds to the sum of the magnetizing currents of all parallel connected current transformers plus the relay current at the relay pick-up voltage. Typically, the operating time for a HiZ differential relay is approximately 1 cycle.
Low impedance differential Scheme (LI)
LI differential protection system employs numeric relays and the CT inputs are connected to individual channels. The relay derives differential signals by executing protection algorithms. These algorithms allow the use of CTs with different ratios since CT matching is performed within the relay. The same CT core can be used by different protection relays. This system derives an operating quantity (differential current -vector sum of all bay currents Prague, 8-11 June 2009 Paper 1065 CIRED2009 Session 3
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connected to the protection zone) and a stabilizing quantity (restraint current -the arithmetic sum of the bay current magnitudes for all feeders connected to the protection zone) and applies a percent (biased) characteristic to ensure the stability of the scheme. The operating characteristic is formed in such a way that higher fault currents require a higher operating (tripping) quantity to trip, corresponding to the gradient of the slope of the stabilizing current. The protection system continuously determines where the operating point is based on the operating characteristic.
Modern LI numeric relays implement percent characteristic and include sophisticated algorithms to cope with severe CT saturation. Some relays are designed to make decisions before the CT saturates. For modern numeric busbar protection schemes, a time-to-saturation of 2-3 ms may be sufficient to stabilize the protection in case of external faults, which requires CTs having smaller overdimensioning factors. Typically, operating times are 1 cycle or less. Numeric relays have also implemented the station disconnector or isolator replica in the relay software. This avoids the need for CT switching.
National Grid, UK is currently under the process of replacing the conventional HiZ busbar protections systems in their substations with modern LI numeric busbar protection schemes. They are also planning to deploy the same schemes in their new substations and substation extensions. This calls for an extensive changeover from the conventional operation, protection and management philosophy adopted by National Grid which is mainly dictated by HiZ busbar protection system. In this regard, National Grid is carrying out a thorough review of performance of LI numeric busbar protection schemes and comparison of their performance with the HiZ systems in matters of security and dependability and familiarity of schemes with the operating personnel. This paper reports a part of the review process in the form of performance comparison of HiZ and LI busbar protection in terms of security, dependability, compatibility with existing protection systems and protection management. The study draws on IEEE and CIGRE reports on deployment of numeric busbar protection, manufacturers' literature, and National Grid's own reliability studies and operational experience of the operating personnel. The paper also highlights some of the key issues, resulting from this study, which should be considered by National Grid before full commissioning of the modern busbar protection.
MODERN NUMERIC BUSBAR PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Both IEEE and CIGRE reports highlight the following advantages of modern numeric schemes over the HiZ schemes: [5] [6] i) LI scheme has better through fault stability than HiZ schemes, though not fully immune to CT saturation problems. It must be remembered that a LI scheme may maloperate on CT saturation if slope is inadequate. On the contrary, a HiZ scheme may be made more stable by correct selection of the stabilising resistor. ii) LI scheme needs moderately strict CT requirements, though appropriately sized CTs are desired for preventing any maloperation. iii)
HiZ scheme is hard-wired. This makes CT switching arrangement for reconfigurable busbar arrangement costly and may also affect reliability of operation of the scheme. It is therefore better to apply this scheme typically only in static bus arrangement applications where the CTs do not need to be switched. For complex bus arrangements, it may be used as a check zone around the entire bus to supervise the individual tripping zones, which are switched. iv)
Numeric relays can implement the station disconnector or isolator replica in the relay software. This reduces the need for moving parts.
The manufacturers offer the following features for numeric protection and claim high reliability and ease of operation and management:
Fully numeric centralized or decentralized busbar protection with integrated breaker failure protection. ii) High-speed and selective protection of MV, HV and EHV busbar installations iii) Modular structure of hardware and software enables the protection to be easily configured to suit the layout of the primary system. iv) System is flexible to suit all configurations of busbars configurations. v) Detects all phase and ground faults in solidly grounded and resistance-grounded power systems and phase faults in ungrounded systems and systems with Petersen coils. vi) Only modest performance requirements for the main CTs. vii) Operates discriminatively for all faults inside the protection zone and remains reliably stable for all faults external to it.
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF HiZ AND LI SCHEMES CONDUCTED BY NATIONAL GRID
In early nineties, National Grid Technology & Science Division, invited Merz and McLellan (M&M) to draw up a proposal for the design of a numeric busbar protection system to meet National Grid's functional requirements and which would lead to a concept specification for numeric busbar protection. A part of the work was concerned with examining the reliability and functionality of two busbar protection systems based on numeric technique in terms of dependability and security. The M&M report examines the reliability and functionality of the Siemens and ABB Prague, 8-11 June 2009 Paper 1065 CIRED2009 Session 3
numeric relays and compares their performance with the existing HiZ schemes in National Grid substations before the actual deployment of any numeric busbar protection schemes in National Grid networks. [4] On the basis of results, the report aims to quantify the contributions of (a) software failure, (b) processor failure, (c) converter failure, (d) common mode failure of trip coils, trip relays and trip relay contacts and (e) failure of DC supply fuses in case of failure to operate on demand and of spurious/indiscriminate operation. The report also indicates that for each extra feeder added to the main busbar, the probability of failure to operate on demand and spurious/indiscriminate operation increases for numeric schemes mainly due to failure of aforementioned contributors. It suggests that probability of failure to operate on demand and the frequency of spurious/indiscriminate operations for numeric schemes can be greatly reduced by (a) decreasing software and processor failure rates and (b) using duplicate DC/DC converters. [4] 
ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GRID POLICY FOR NUMERIC BUSBAR PROTECTION
The M&M reliability study was based on theoretical data, some technical assumptions and older numeric schemes. It was not based on actual operational data. Further to this study, National Grid performed another reliability study of HiZ and LI systems to analyse this discrepancy and assess their current policy of deploying numeric busbar protection. This report compares the dependability and security of conventional HiZ system and all LI numeric schemes used in National Grid networks. It also looks into future developments in busbar protection such as Optical Instrument Current Transducers and a universal numeric substation protocol. Unlike the previous reports, this study considers the failure history of the schemes. The report highlights some key differences between the HiZ and LI busbar protection schemes in the following areas with regard to their actual installation, commissioning and operation in National Grid networks. [7] - [11] Supervision Scheme
In HiZ system, simple CT supervision through neutral current supervision technique is implemented through hardwired circuits. Therefore this system is prone to hardware failure. Otherwise, the system is very dependable. On the other hand, all three LI numeric systems use self supervision routines, which include CT supervision through neutral current supervision and protection against AD converter failure or measurement error. [7] - [11] CT Saturation
HiZ operation is considerably affected by CT mismatch. It relies heavily on all the CTs being very similar in performance, which is generally achieved by purchasing CTs from the same batch. Moreover, the CTs require regular maintenance to ensure that their performance does not alter significantly. On the other hand, the LI schemes have built-in algorithms for eliminating the effect of CT saturation. [7] - [11] CT Switching
Physical switching of CTs is required when HiZ schemes are used for reconfigurable busbar arrangements. CT switching is problematic because of several risks associated with the timing of switching and with the switching operation itself. The timing of CT switching is important, because if a CT is connected to the incorrect zone, the system could instantly trip. However, a correctly functioning check zone would prevent this. The safety risk associated with CT switching is that if a malfunction causes a CT to become open circuited, it could cause serious injury to operating personnel. Due to the mechanical nature of the isolators and auxiliary CT contacts, both these issues are considered with due importance for National Grid systems.
Even if dependability and security of the HiZ scheme can be increased by using 2 out of 2 principle with proper CT supervision, yet security, dependability and safety reduce drastically due to this external switching of CT contacts. On the other hand, no external CT switching of auxiliary contacts is required for numeric protection schemes. This is because the primary busbar replica is stored in software within the central unit of these schemes. Changes in isolator position cause this internal replica to change, such that the central unit assigns the correct CT measurements to the correct zones. [7] - [11] CT Usage
Hardwired HiZ scheme uses separate CTs for check and discriminating zone protections. On the contrary, the numeric schemes use the internal analysis of CT output values to eliminate the effects of CT saturation. Therefore, a single CT can be used for both check and discriminating zones. [7] - [11] Protection Management
Protection management of numeric protection is very different from that of HiZ protection, particularly for commissioning and adding new sections to the system during substation expansion. For HiZ scheme, during a substation expansion, a standard set of tests could be undertaken on the new parts of the protection system. These tests help to ensure the correct operation of the addition. Moreover, it can also be ensured that the original equipment remains unaffected by the change. On the other hand, LI scheme does not have the same degree of external wiring as HiZ scheme and its complexity is mainly internal. For numeric scheme, the manufacturer performs tests on the whole system, before it is deployed live. However, when a substation expansion takes place, a complete on-site test is not viable, due to loss of protection, and tests like those in Prague, 8-11 June 2009 Paper 1065
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HiZ do not apply. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain that unchanged components will remain unaffected after extension. Therefore, new testing guidelines would be necessary to allow confidence in an upgrade prior to live deployment of numeric busbar protection schemes. [7] - [11] Failure History Fig.-1 shows the failure and incidence history of HiZ and numeric busbar protection schemes deployed in National Grid networks. The failure history of HiZ schemes shows that there are generally one or two defects per year. For a few defects, the failure mode is unclear. Some defects may be due to a limited number of reporting by the busbar protection system, missing equipment or incorrect settings and human error. On the other hand, the failure history of numeric systems shows that the faults were due to processor and MMI failure and incorrect relay setting. These faults are often taken care of by improvement in the design through software upgrades. [7] - [11] 
NEEDS OF FURTHER INVESTIGATION
The previous reports in question do not look into the detailed operational experience in National Grid substations since 2001 till date. Thus there is a need to generate a detailed report on substation-wise operational experience on numeric busbar protection till date. The report should contain a list of (a) the busbar protection incidents, (b) any failure in operation or spurious operation, (c) probable cause of failure, (d) how it was detected and taken care of, (e) whether there was any need of software upgrade, (f) the contingency plan for that substation, (g) whether contingency plan had to be actually employed and (h) time duration for which busbar protection was out of service. In this respect it would be of great importance to study the following issues from operational experience: (a) Out of possible causes of failure, how the need for software upgrade was arrived at (whether detected by substation personnel or by the manufacturer 
REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF NATIONAL GRID
A review of the operational experience was taken up by National Grid to compare the respective merits and demerits of HiZ and numeric LI busbar protection schemes from a Construction Perspective as a part of a Report on the Life Time Issues of Busbar Protection. The review aimed at i) critically looking into the operational and management issues related to both types of schemes and ii) looking into the technical issues that must be resolved for smooth and successful transition from HiZ busbar protection schemes to numeric LI schemes in National Grid substations. This report summarises the key points of the discussion as given in Table- 1. 
2.
Number of busbar protection incidents was few. According to operational reports, the operation of HiZ schemes have been satisfactory with a high level of security Some incidents of maloperations have been noted and taken care of. According to operational reports, the security of LI schemes is lower than HiZ schemes.
3.
Life expectancy of HiZ schemes is longer, almost same as that of a substation. This makes lifetime management easier. But with rapid worldwide advances in numeric LI schemes all over the world, replaceability of HI schemes may be a problem in future due to non-availability of components.
Life expectancy of LI schemes is significantly shorter than HiZ, probably 15/20 years. Thus lifetime management plan should be deferred. This is necessary for reviewing and executing periodic replacement and upgrading the schemes as and when required.
4.
Since HiZ schemes are hardwired, they are much Software controlled LI schemes are not easy to manage during Prague, 8-11 June 2009 Paper 1065 CIRED2009 Session 3
easier to understand and manage on-site. Handling incidents and maloperations is easy as the wirings can be physically traced. Manufacturer's assistance and support is not always necessary. This helps the operating personnel to get more familiar with the protection schemes and gain confidence in handling and managing them. incidents or maloperations due to lack of visibility of the internal and interfacing circuitry. This needs constant support and assistance from manufacturers.
5.
For HiZ schemes, extension is a problem as it involves huge amount of secondary wiring and terminations. The space requirement is also more for a bay extension. Sometimes, extension is not possible beyond a certain limit.
Extension is easier for LI schemes due to lack of secondary wiring. Space requirement is less.
6.
The sources of maloperation for HiZ schemes are secondary wiring and termination, stabilising resistor, problems due to CT switching etc. HiZ schemes also tend to fail in inoperative state.
Sources of maloperation for numeric LI schemes are software bugs, hardware failure, problems in documentation of manufacturers instructions etc.
7.
For HiZ schemes, operation and management problems arise from stringent CT requirements, huge wiring, CT switching, long cabling required to reduce burden on trip circuits especially when the CTs are located remotely.
For numeric LI schemes, operation and management problems arise from total dependence on manufacturers for software upgrades and maintenance. Moreover, the LI schemes are deployed in National Grid substations as 1 out of 1 systems backed up by contingency plans. The contingency plan ensures alternate protection arrangement for the busbars when the numeric busbar protection is taken out of service. Operational experience indicates that deployment of contingency plan takes a long time and the busbar tends to remain unprotected when its LI scheme is taken out of service.
SCOPES OF INVESTIGATION FOR NATIONAL GRID
The following scopes of investigation are drawn up by National Grid after reviewing their operational experience on LI numeric busbar protection systems a) There is a need for a comprehensive review of HiZ scheme deployment and extensions in National Grid substations. Calculation of HiZ schemes, operating stability, fault level limits in substations, impact of extension on other bays due to changes in resistors, cable sizes etc. must be thoroughly reviewed from existing records. Moreover, problems of further extension of HiZ schemes and extension limits (with the causes) should be studied substation wise. The effect of using multiple overlapping HiZ bus zones should be investigated. The initial reliability of the HiZ design should be rechecked and the number of design iterations noted. The cost of deploying and extending HiZ schemes should be compared with that of numeric busbar protection schemes. Sources of maloperation of HiZ schemes (e.g. stabilising resistors, secondary wiring, metrosils, disconnector contacts etc.) must be reviewed from operational records. Also, possibility and previous instances of failure of HiZ schemes in inoperative state must be investigated.
b) The major advantage of numeric schemes is extension and future rebuilding is much simpler. But operational experience shows that, unlike HiZ schemes, on-site management of numeric schemes, handling maloperation incidents and maintenance schedules are too much dependent on manufacturers' assistance. Moreover, since deployment, maloperation incidents of numeric busbar protection in some substations do not indicate a high security of operation as claimed by the manufacturers. In this regard, there are needs to review the Replacement Strategy of busbar protection for substations, to test and quantify security issues and to find out manufacturers' solutions to security. There should be close communication with all the manufacturers regarding improving the security of numeric schemes so that maloperation incidents are reduced. On-site or factory testing arrangements for new configurations should be planned to check or predict maloperations, though it is easier to test dependability than security for any protection scheme. c) For all substations running on 1 out of 1 numeric busbar protection arrangement, there is a contingency plan to ensure alternate back-up protection of the busbar in case the numeric busbar protection is unavailable. But deployment of contingency plan may take a long time and hence busbar may remain unprotected over a long period if the numeric busbar protection is taken out of service. An alternative is to keep two central or main busbar protection units, one operating and the other offline used as a hot standby. In case the operating unit fails, the offline unit is brought into service. This arrangement makes managing emergency conditions easier and saves time. The two units are connected via optical patching, therefore it is comparatively easy to changeover the entire bay unit interfacing from one central unit to the other. Currently there is no provision to keep central units active in the same network by using fibre splitters to interface both units to the bay units simultaneously. This provision may further be investigated. f) Main issues of concern for LI schemes are reliability of operation (improving security) and replacement after 15-20 years owing to obsolescence of software. These must be addressed in lifetime management plans.
g) A maintenance schedule for the new numeric busbar protection schemes should be formulated.
h) For managing changes and extensions, National Grid must look into the lack of backward compatibility for the numeric schemes of some manufacturers. Clear management methods should be formulated for introduction of new software into a live network.
i) Regarding commissioning, replacement schemes require numeric busbar protection schemes to be over-layed on existing schemes and then to be commissioned on a bay-bybay basis. Whether HiZ scheme may be kept in service until all bays are commissioned should be investigated. j) There is a need to compare and quantify both HiZ and numeric schemes against various lifetime factors.
k) The known numeric busbar protection failures must be thoroughly reviewed with respect to the following substations to check for any learning points.
CONCLUSION
IEEE and CIGRE reports, manufacturer specifications and the National Grid reliability studies and assessments on HiZ and Li numeric busbar protection schemes highlight several advantages of the low impedance scheme. Major advantages are improved dependability and security in operation, better stability against through faults, greater tolerance to CT mismatch and CT saturation, software-based selfmonitoring feature and CT supervision, no physical CT switching due to built-in isolator replica in the central unit and better CT usage. However review of operational experience from National Grid substations regarding LI schemes bring out some application, protection management and commissioning issues that should be addressed by National Grid before numeric LI busbar protection is deployed in substations. Reliability of software and processor functioning should be improved to enhance performance of the protective relays. Provision should be there for software upgrade as per client requirements. In case of substation expansion new testing guidelines should be framed for ensuring that such upgrades will not affect the operation of the overall busbar protection, nor pose any compatibility problem with rest of the unchanged system.
